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ABSTRACT 
 
``People say again and again that philosophy doesn´t really progress, that we are 
still occupied with the same philosophical problems as were the Greeks. But the 
people who say this don´t understand why it has to be so. It is because our language 
has remained the same and keeps seducing us into asking the same questions. As 
long as there continues to be a verb ´to be´ that looks as if it functions in the same 
way as ´to eat and to drink´, as long as we still have the adjectives ´identical´, ´true´, 
´false´, ´possible´, as long as we continue to talk of a river of time, of an expanse of 
space, etc., etc., people will keep stumbling over the same puzzling difficulties and 
find themselves staring at something which no explanation seems capable of 
clearing up. And what´s more, this satisfies a longing for the transcendent, because, 
insofar as people think they can see the ‘limits of human understanding´, they 
believe of course that they can see beyond these.``   
 
This quote is from Ludwig Wittgenstein who redefined philosophy some 70 years 
ago (but most people have yet to find this out). Dennett, though he has been a 
philosopher for some 40 years, is one of them. It is also curious that both he and his 
prime antagonist, John Searle, studied under famous Wittgensteinians (Searle with 
John Austin, Dennett with Gilbert Ryle) but Searle more or less got the point and 
Dennett did not, (though it is stretching things to call Searle or Ryle 
Wittgensteinians). Dennett is a hard determinist (though he tries to sneak reality in 
the back door), and perhaps this is due to Ryle, whose famous book ´The Concept 
of Mind´(1949) continues to be reprinted. That book did a great job of exorcising the 
ghost, but it left the machine.  
 
Dennett enjoys making the mistakes Wittgenstein, Ryle (and many others since) 
have exposed in detail. Our use of the words consciousness, choice, freedom, 
intention, particle, thinking, determines, wave, cause, happened, event (and so on 
endlessly) are rarely a source of confusion, but as soon as we leave normal life and 
enter philosophy (and any discussion detached from the environment in which 
language evolved—i.e., the exact context in which the words had meaning) chaos 
reigns. Like most, Dennett lacks a coherent framework - which Searle has called the 
logical structure of rationality. I have expanded on this considerably since I wrote 
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this review and my recent articles show in detail what is wrong with Dennett's 
approach to philosophy, which one might call Scientism on steroids. Let me end 
with another quote from Wittgenstein--´Ambition is the death of thought´. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from 
the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of 
Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John 
Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking 
Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed 
Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) and Suicidal Utopian 
Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019). 
 
``People say again and again that philosophy doesn´t really progress, that we are 
still occupied with the same philosophical problems as were   the Greeks.  But the 
people who say this   don´t understand why it has to be so.  It is because our 
language has remained the same and keeps seducing us into asking the same 
questions. As long as there continues to be a verb  ´ to  be´ that  looks as if it  functions  
in the  same way as ´to eat´ and  ´to  drink´,  as  long as we still have the adjectives  
´identical´, ´true´,  ´false´,  ´possible´, as long as we continue to  talk of a river of 
time, of  an expanse of space, etc., etc., people  will keep stumbling over the same 
puzzling difficulties and find themselves staring at something which no 
explanation seems capable of clearing up. And what´s more, this satisfies a longing 
for the transcendent, because, insofar as people think they can see `the limits of 
human understanding´, they believe of course that they can see beyond these.`` 
 
“Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of 
language”.  
 
 “Ambition is the death of thought” 
 
“Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are 
irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This 
tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into complete 
darkness.” (BBB p18). 
 
 
“How does the philosophical problem about mental processes and states and about 
behaviorism arise? – The first step is the one that altogether escapes notice. We talk 
about processes and states and leave their nature undecided. Sometime perhaps we 
shall know more about them-we think. But that is just what commits us to a 
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particular way of looking at the matter. For we have a definite concept of what it 
means to learn to know a process better. (The decisive movement in the conjuring 
trick has been made, and it was the very one we thought quite innocent). —And 
now the analogy which was to make us understand our thoughts falls to pieces. So, 
we have to deny the yet uncomprehended process in the yet unexplored medium. 
And now it looks as though we had denied mental processes. And naturally we 
don’t want to deny them.   W PI p308 
 
These quotes are from Ludwig Wittgenstein, who redefined philosophy some 70 
years ago (but most people have yet to find this out).  Dennett, though he has been 
a philosopher for some 40 years, is one them. It is also curious that both he and his 
prime antagonist, John Searle, studied under famous Wittgensteinians (Searle with 
John Austin, Dennett with Gilbert Ryle) but Searle at least partially got the point 
and Dennett did not. Dennett is a hard determinist (though he tries to sneak reality 
in the back door), and perhaps this is due to Ryle, whose famous book ´ The Concept 
of Mind´(1949) continues to be reprinted. That book did a great job of exorcising the 
ghost but it left the machine. Dennett enjoys making the mistakes Wittgenstein, Ryle 
(and many others since) have exposed in detail. By accident, just before this book, I 
had read ´´The Minds I´´, which Dennett coauthored with Douglas Hofstadter in 
1981. They made some bad mistakes (see my review), and saddest of all, they 
reprinted two famous articles that pointed the way out of the mess--- Nagel´s ` What 
is like to be a bat?` and an early version of John Searle´s Chinese Room argument 
explaining why computers don´t think. 
 
Nagel pointed out that we do not even know how to recognize what a concept of a 
bat´s mind would be like.  Searle similarly explained how we lack a way to 
conceptualize   thinking and how it differs from what a computer does (e.g., it can 
translate Chinese without understanding it). Likewise, we lack a clear test for 
recognizing what counts as good vs bad--or just intelligible-- for many 
philosophical and scientific concepts. Our use of the words consciousness, choice, 
freedom, intention, particle, thinking, determines, wave, cause, happened, event 
(and so on endlessly) are rarely a source of confusion but as soon as we leave normal 
life and enter philosophy (and any discussion detached from the environment in 
which language evolved—i.e., the exact context in which the words had meaning) 
chaos  reigns. Wittgenstein was the first to understand why and to point out how 
to avoid this. Unfortunately, he died in his prime, his works are composed almost 
entirely of a series of examples of how the mind (language) works, and he never 
wrote any popular books, so understanding of his work is restricted to a very few. 
 
Searle is one of the world´s leading philosophers and has written many extremely 
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clear and highly regarded articles and books, some of which have pointed out the 
glaring defects in Dennett´s work. His review ``Consciousness Explained Away´´ of 
Dennett’s 1991 book `´Consciousness Explained´´ and   his book ´´The Mystery of 
Consciousness´´ are very well -known, and show, in a way that is amazingly clear 
for philosophical writing, why neither Dennett (nor any of the hundreds of 
philosophers and scientists who have written on this topic) have come close to 
explaining the hard problem—i.e., how do you conceptualize consciousness. Of 
course in my view (and Wittgenstein’s) there is no ‘hard problem’ only confusion 
about the use of language.  Many suspect we will never be able to ‘conceptualize’ 
any of the really important things (though I think W made it clear that they are 
mixing up the very hard scientific issue with the very simple issue of how to use the 
word), but it is clear that we are nowhere near it now as a scientific issue. My own 
view is that the scientific issue is straightforward as we can see ‘consciousness’ 
being put together a few neurons at a time by evolution and by development. And 
the ‘concept’ is a language game like any others and one just needs to get clear 
(specify clear COS) about how we will use the word. 
 
Dennett has mostly ignored his critics but has favored Searle with vituperative 
personal attacks. Searle has been accused by Dennett and others of being out to 
destroy cognitive psychology which is quite funny, as modern philosophy is in the 
narrow academic sense a branch of cognitive psychology (the descriptive 
psychology of higher order thought), and Searle has made it very clear for 30 years 
that WE are a good example of a biological machine that is conscious, thinks, etc. 
He just points out that we don´t have any idea how this happens. Searle 
characterizes as ´´intellectual pathology´´, the views of Dennett and all those who 
deny the existence of the very phenomena they set out to explain. 
 
Dennett repeats his mistakes here and leaves his reply to his critics to the 
penultimate page of the book, where we are told that they are all mistaken and it is 
a waste of space to show how!  Unsurprisingly, there is not one reference to 
Wittgenstein or Searle in the entire book. There are however, many references to 
other old school philosophers who are as confused as he is. It is scientism writ 
large—the almost universal mistake of mixing together the real empirical issue of 
science with the issues of how the language is to be used (language games) of 
philosophy. 
 
Like most people, it does not cross his mind that the very inference engines he 
thinks with are forcing him to come to certain conclusions and that these will often 
be quite unconnected with or wrong about the way things are in the world. They 
are a jumble of evolutionary curiosities which do various tasks in organizing 
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behavior that were useful for survival hundreds of thousands of years ago. 
Wittgenstein was a pioneer in doing thought experiments in cognitive psychology 
and began to elucidate the nature of these engines and the subtleties of language in 
the 30´s, and thus he made the sorts of comments that this review begins with. 
 
Dennett says (p98) that his view is compatibilism, i.e., that free will (which I hope, 
for coherence, we can equate with choice) is compatible with determinism (i.e., that 
´´there is at any instant exactly one physically possible future´´--p25).  He wants to 
show that determinism is not the same as inevitability. 
 
However, the whole book is smoke and mirrors by means of which choice, in the 
sense we normally understand it, disappears and we are left with ``choice``, which 
is something we cannot choose. Naturally, this echoes the fate of consciousness in 
his earlier book ``Consciousness Explained``. 
 
It is remarkable that, at a time when we are just beginning to reach the point where 
we might be able to understand the basics of how a single neuron works (or how 
an atom works for that matter), that anyone should think they can make the leap to 
understanding the whole brain and to explain its most complex phenomena. Please 
recall the last sentence of Wittgenstein from the opening quote: ´´ And what´s more, 
this satisfies a longing forthe transcendent, because, insofar as people think they 
can see `the limits of human understanding´, they believe of course that they can 
see beyond these.`` The language games are highly varied and exquisitely context 
sensitive so everyone gets lost.  If we are very, very careful, we can lay out the 
language games (e.g., specify the Conditions of Satisfaction of various statements 
using the words consciousness, choice, reality, mind etc.) and clarity becomes 
possible, but Dennett throws caution to the winds and we are dragged into the 
quicksand. 
 
There are at least 3 different topics here (evolution of our brain, choice and morality) 
and Dennett tries vainly to weld them together into a coherent account of how 
freedom evolves from the deterministic crashing of atoms. There is, however, no 
compelling reason to accept that bouncing atoms (or his favorite example, the game 
of life running on a computer) are isomorphic with reality. It never occurs to him 
that unless he exactly specifies a context and so the COS (Conditions of 
Satisfaction—i.e., what makes the statements true or false), his statements lack 
meaning.  He knows that quantum indeterminacy (or the uncertainty principle) is 
a major obstacle to determinism, however defined (and has been taken by many as 
an escape to freedom), but dismisses it due to the fact that such events are too rare 
to bother with. By extension, it’s unlikely that any such event will happen now or 
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even in our whole lifetime in our brain, so we appear to be stuck with a determined 
brain (whatever that may be, i.e., he never specifies the COS). However, the 
universe is a big place and it’s been around a long time (perhaps ‘forever’) and if 
even one such quantum effect occurs it would seem to throw the whole universe 
into an indeterminate state. The notion ´´there is at any instant exactly one 
physically possible future´´ cannot be true if at any instant, a quantum 
indeterminacy can occur--in this case there would seem to be infinitely many 
possible futures. But again, what exactly are the COS of this statement? This recalls 
one of the escapes from the contradictions of physics—each instant our universe is 
branching into infinitely many universes. 
 
He correctly rejects the idea that quantum indeterminacy gives us the answer to 
how we can have choice. This obvious idea has been suggested by many, but the 
problem is that nobody has any idea how to specify an exact sequence of steps 
which starts with the equations of physics and ends up with the phenomena of 
consciousness (or any other emergent phenomenon). If so, they will definitely win 
at least one Nobel Prize, for not only will they have ‘explained’ consciousness, they 
will have ‘explained’ (or much better ‘described’ as Wittgenstein insisted) the 
universal phenomenon of emergence (how higher order properties emerge from 
lower ones). So, they would have to solve the ´ easy´ problem (to determine the exact 
state of the brain corresponding to some mental state and preferably specify the 
exact position of all the atoms in the brain over time-ignoring uncertainty) and the 
´hard´ one (what exactly correlates with or produces consciousness or choice etc.?). 
And while they are at it how about also doing the impossible--an exact and full 
solution to the quantum field equations for a brain. It is very well known that these 
equations are uncomputable, even for one atom or a vacuum, as it would require 
an infinite amount of computer time. But infinite will do for one atom so maybe a 
brain will take no longer. It never crosses his mind (nor anyone I have seen) that 
nobody can make clear how an atom ‘emerges’ from electrons, neutrons and 
protons or a molecule emerges from atoms nor cells from molecules etc. Yes, there 
are some equations but if you look carefully you will see lots of hand waving and 
facts that are just accepted as ‘the way things are’ and so I think it clearly is the same 
with consciousness, color, choice, pain emerging from bunches of cells.  Of course, 
after Wittgenstein we realize that mixed up with the scientific questions are the 
philosophical ones—i.e., the different uses (meanings, COS) of the words are not 
kept clear and so the discussions are mostly incoherent.  
 
He starts off on the first page appealing to the laws of  physics for  protection  
against fantastic notions such as immaterial souls, but physics is made of notions 
just as fantastic (uncertainty, entanglement, wave/particle duality, Schrodinger´s 
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dead/alive cat etc.) and as Feynmann said many times ``Nobody understands 
physics!´´ Many think nobody ever will and I am one of many who say there is 
nothing to ‘understand’ but rather there is just lots of ‘things’ along with existence, 
space, time, matter etc. to accept. There is a limit to what our tiny brain can do and 
maybe we are at that limit now.  
 
Even if we create a massive computer that could understand (in some sense) far 
better than we, it is not clear that it could explain to us. Understanding an idea 
requires a certain level of intelligence or power (e.g., holding a certain number of 
things in mind and performing a certain number of calculations/second). Most 
people will never grasp the abstruse math of string theory no matter how long they 
have to do it. And it is not clear that string theory (or any other) makes sense as a 
mathematical (i.e., real) representation of our world.  This requires clear COS which 
I think string theory, the quantum theory of mind etc etc lack.  So, there is good 
reason to suppose that our supersmart computer, even if we teach it how to think 
in the ‘same’ sense that we do, will never be able to explain really complex things 
to us. But as always we are need to specify the exact context to be able to see the 
meanings (COS) of the words and most science of this sort has no awareness of the 
problem.  
 
On the first page is one of his favorite quotes, which compares the brain to a bunch 
of tiny robots, and on pg2 he says that we are made of mindless robots. But what 
are the COS for an entity having a mind?  The way the brain (and any cell) works is 
nothing at all like the way robots work and we don´t even know how to 
conceptualize the difference (i.e., we know how robots work but not how brains 
work—e.g., how do they make choices, understand images and motives etc.). As I 
noted above, this was pointed out by Searle 30 years ago but Dennett (and countless 
others) just does not get it. 
 
We are also told on the first page that science will let us understand our freedom 
and give us a better foundation for our morality. So far as I can see, neither science 
nor philosophy, nor religion, has any effect on our understanding of our freedom 
or morality.  Although he discusses the biology of altruism and rational choice at 
length, he never mentions the abundant evidence from cognitive psychology that 
our moral intuitions are built in and demonstrable in 4 year old children.  Instead, 
he spends much time trying to show how choice and morality come from memories 
of events and our interaction with others.  On  pg2 he says our values have little to 
do with the ‘goals’ of our cells and on pg2 to 3 that our personality differences are 
due to how our ´´robotic teams are put together, over a lifetime of growth and 
experience.`` This is a bald dismissal of human nature, of the abundant evidence 
 8 
 
that our differences are to a large extent programmed into our genes and fixed in 
early childhood, and is typical of his constant confused wandering back and forth 
between determinism and environmentalism (i.e., his view that we develop 
morality over time by experience and by thinking aboutmoral issues). But again he 
mixes scientific issues with philosophical ones, i.e., exactly what game are we 
playing with “robot”, “mind”, “determined”, “free” etc.?  Many other sections of 
the book show the same confusion.  Those who don´t know the scientific evidence 
may wish to read Pinker´s ´´The Blank Slate´´, Boyer´s´´Religion Explained´´ and 
any of the hundred or so recent texts, and tens of thousands of articles and web 
pages on personality development, and evolutionary and cognitive psychology. 
 
On pg4 he says bison don´t know they are bison and that we have known we are 
mammals for only a few hundred years. Both show a fundamental lack of 
understanding of cognitive psychology. The cognitive templates for ontological 
categories were evolved, in their original forms, hundreds of millions of years ago 
and animals have the inborn ability to recognize others of their species and of other 
species and classes of animals and plants and objects without any learning sufficient 
to establish categories. Bison know they are like other bison and our ancestors knew 
they were like other mammals and that reptiles were different but similar to each 
other etc.   Cognitive studies have shown these types of abilities in very young 
children. Again are we using “know” in its System 1 prelinguistic sense or in its 
System 2 linguistic one?  See my other writings for the utility of the two systems of 
thought viewpoint.  
 
Of course, it is true that the words ´bison´ and ´mammal´ are recent, but they have 
nothing to do with how our brains work. 
 
On page 5 he attributes postmodernism´s hostility to science as a product of ´fearful 
thinking´ but does not speculate why that is. In spite of his acquaintance with 
cognitive psychology he does not see that this is likely due to the fact that many 
science results clash with the feelings normally produced by the operation of the 
inference engines for intuitive psychology, coalition, social mind, social exchange, 
etc. as I discuss elsewhere. 
 
On page 9 he notes that free will is a problem and our attitudes to it make a 
difference, but for whom? Nobody but philosophers. We make choices. What´s the 
problem? One has to step outside life to experience a problem and then everything 
becomes a problem. What are consciousness, pain, yellow, intention, matter, 
quarks, gravity etc.? I doubt that any normal person has ever experienced a 
fundamental change in their interactions with people or their decision-making 
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processes due to their thinking about choice. This shows that there is something 
strange about such questions. Wittgenstein shows that the language games are 
different. There are games for language connected with the cognitive templates for 
decisions, or seeing colors etc., and thinking philosophically is typically using the 
words in the wrong context or without any clear context (one can call this 
decoupled), so without clear COS (meaning).   
 
Decoupled modes permit thinking about the past, planning for the future, guessing 
the mental states of others, etc., but if one takes the results in the wrong way and 
starts to think `´John will try to steal my wallet´´, rather than just imagining that 
John might do it, confusion enters and those who cannot turn off the decoupled 
mode or distinguish it from coupled mode, enter the realm of pathology. Some 
aspects of schizophrenia and other mental illness might be seen this way--they lose 
control of which mode they are in, e.g., not being able to see the difference between 
the motives people have and the motives they might have, between one language 
game and another. 
 
One can then see much of the philosophizing people do as operating in these 
decoupled (counterfactual) modes, but failing to be able to keep in front of them the 
differences from the normal mode. Normal mode—e.g., what is that lion doing-- 
was undoubtedly the first one evolved and decoupled modes--what did that lion 
do last time or what does he intend to do next--evolved later. This was probably 
never a problem for animals--any animal that spent too much time worrying about 
what might happen would not be very successful contributing to the gene pool. 
 
 It is interesting to speculate that only when humans developed culture and began 
degenerating genetically, could large numbers of people survive with genes that led 
them to spend alot of time in decoupled modes. Hence, we have philosophy and 
this book, which is mostly about running the decision templates in decoupled mode 
where there are no real consequences except earning royalties for putting the results 
in a book for other people to use to run their engines in decoupled mode. Let us 
alter Wittgenstein´s quote to read: ´´As long as there continues to be a verb ´to 
decide´ that looks as if it functions in the same way as ´to eat´ and ´to drink´, as long 
as we continue to talk of freedom of action, of saying I wish I had done otherwise, 
etc., etc., people will keep stumbling over the same puzzling difficulties and find 
themselves staring at something which no explanation seems capable of clearing 
up.´´ 
 
As with most philosophy books, nearly every page, often every paragraph, changes 
from one type of language game to another, without noticing that now one would 
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have to be joking or dreaming or acting in a play or reciting a story, etc., and not 
actually intending anything, nor describing an actual situation in the world. On 
page 10 he says we count on free will for the whole way of thinking about our lives, 
like we count on food and water, but whoever, outside philosophy, standing in 
front of lunch counter full of food, ever thinks how fine it is that they have free will 
so they can pick coke instead of mineral water? Even if I want to be a serious 
compatibilist and try thinking this in decoupled mode, I have to exit and enter 
nondecoupled mode to make the actual choice. Only then can I go back to 
decoupled mode to wonder what might have happened if I had not had the ability 
to make a real choice.  
 
Wittgenstein noted how pretend games are parasitic on real ones (this is not a trivial 
observation!). The ability to engage in very complex decoupled scenarios is already 
evident in 4 year old children. So, I would say that normally, nobody counts on 
having choice, but rather we just choose. As Wittgenstein made clear it is action 
based on certainty that is the bedrock of our life. See the recent writings of Daniele 
Moyal-Sharrock and my other writings. 
 
On the same page, he shows again that he does not grasp cognitive basics. He says 
we learn to conduct our lives in the conceptual atmosphere of choice, and that `´It 
appears to be a stable and ahistorical construct, as eternal and unchanging as 
arithmetic, but it is not.´´ And on page 13--´´It is an evolved creation  of human 
activity and beliefs´´. The whole thrust of cognitive psychology (and Wittgenstein) 
is that we do NOT (and CANNOT) learn the basics of planning, deciding, 
promising, resenting, etc., but that these are built-in functions of the inference 
engines that work automatically and unconsciously and start running in very early 
childhood.  
 
On pg 14 he suggests it’s probable that our having free will depends on our 
believing we have it! Do we believe we see an apple, feel a pain, are happy? The 
language game of belief is very different from that of knowing in the words are 
incoherent (no clear COS) in the way that Dennett often uses them. We can believe 
we have a dollar in our pocket, but if we take it out and look at it we can´t 
meaningfully then say that we still believe it (except as a joke etc.). The inference 
engine can run in decoupled (belief) mode so we can imagine having choices or 
making them, but in life we just make them, and it is only in very odd situations we 
can say that we believe we made a choice. But Dennett is saying this is the universal 
case. If making a choice had any dependence on belief than so would everything 
else-- consciousness, seeing, thinking, etc. If we take this seriously (and he says ´the 
serious problems of free will´) then we are getting into trouble and if we actually 
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try to apply it to life, then madness is minutes away. He, like all philosophers until 
recently, had no clue that Wittgenstein showed us the way out of this need to 
ground our actions on beliefs by describing the actual basis of knowing which is the 
ungrounded ‘hinges’ or automatisms of System 1 thinking in his last work ‘On 
Certainty’. Daniele Moyal-Sharrock has explained this over the last decade and I 
have summarized her work and incorporated it in my reviews and articles. 
 
On page 65 et seq., he discusses causation, intention and the `informal predicates´ 
that we use to describe atoms etc., but cognitive research has shown that we 
describe all ‘objects’ with a limited number of ontological categories, which we 
analyze with our intuitive physics modules, and that when agents (i.e., animals or 
people or things like them—i.e., ghosts or gods) are involved, we use our concepts 
(engines) for agency, intuitive psychology, social minds, etc. to decide how to 
behave. There is almost certainly no causation module but rather it will involve all 
of these and other inference engines, depending on the precise situation. Discussing 
possibility and necessity is much easier if one talks in terms of the output of our 
modules for intuitive physics, agency, ontological categories etc. Of course, there is 
no mention here of Wittgenstein´s many incisive comments on the language games 
of causation, intention, deciding, nor of Searle´s classic works on Intention and 
Social Reality. 
 
He spends much time on Ainslie´s book ´Breakdown of Will´, in which is discussed 
the hyperbolic discounting faculties (i.e., inference engines) by which we evaluate 
probable outcomes.   
 
He makes much of the excellent work of Robert Frank on altruism, emotion and 
economics, but the book he cites was 15 years old when this book was published. It 
was Bingham´s idea, amplified by Frank and by Boyd and Richardson (1992) that 
cooperation was greatly stimulated by the evolution of means for punishing 
cheaters.  He suggests these as examples of Darwinian approaches that are 
obligatory and promising.  Indeed, they are, and in fact they are standard parts of 
economic, evolutionary and cognitive theory, but unfortunately, he makes little 
reference to the other work in these fields. All that work tends to show that people 
do not choose but their brains choose for them (System 1 fast automatic ‘choices’ vs 
System 2 slow deliberative ‘choices’).   He does not establish any convincing 
connection between this work and the general problem of choice and like nearly all 
philosophers has no grasp of the powerful two systems of thought framework.  
 
Philosophers of all stripes have been hypnotized by their ability to decouple the 
inference engines to play `what if´´ games, loving to put counterintuitive tags on 
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ontological categories (i.e., if Socrates was immortal etc.). In this respect, they share 
some elements with primitive religion (see Boyer). This is not a joke, nor an insult, 
but merely points out that once one has a grasp of modern cognitive concepts, one 
sees that they apply thoughout the whole spectrum of human activity (and it would 
be odd if they did not). But as Wittgenstein explained so beautifully, the language 
games and the inference engines of S2 have their limits--explanations come to an 
end--we hit bedrock (S1). But the philosopher thinks he can see beyond it and walks 
out on the water, or as Wittgenstein put it, into absolute darkness.  
 
On pg 216 he says that making oneself so that one could not have done otherwise 
is a key innovation in the evolutionary ascent to free will, and that we can only be 
free if we learn how to render ourselves insensitive to opportunities. Again, one can 
say anything but one cannot mean (state clear COS) for anything, and Dennett does 
not even begin to clarify the COS. And how these ‘abilities’ function (i.e., the games 
of ‘will’, ‘self’, ‘choice’, ‘cause’ etc.) is never made clear.  Dennett has a penchant for 
hiding his ideas in a massive amount of rather irrelevant text (i.e., he is a true 
philosopher!).  
 
Again, he gets things backwards, as there is a vast body of very good evidence from 
biology and psychology that we get the feelings that we should behave in some way 
from our inference engines, and these are not provided by some part of our 
conscious self, but by the automatic and unconscious operation of the engines. As 
he notes, hundreds of experiments with the Prisoner´s Dilemma and related 
protocols have shown how easy it is to manipulate people´s choices and that their 
calculations are not conscious and deliberate at all and in fact much of modern 
psychological, sociological and neuroeconomics research is devoted to 
distinguishing the automatisms of S1 from the deliberative thinking of S2 and 
showing how S1 rules. 
 
When the situation is manipulated to make people conscious, they are much slower 
and less reliable (S2). So, there has been constant pressure of natural selection to 
make the engines fast and automatic and inaccessible to deliberate thought. 
 
Dennett says `we make ourselves´ so that we could not do otherwise and that this 
is the basis of morality and choice. The evidence is exactly the opposite. Our 
inference engines give us basic moral intuitions and we generally act in accord with 
the results. If we or others do not, we feel guilt, outrage, resentment etc., and then 
cheater genes will invade the population and this is one of the main theories as to 
how a good part of morality evolved. Our genes make us so we can´t (mostly) do 
otherwise, not our will or whatever Dennett thinks can do it. We can often choose 
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to do otherwise, but our own intuitions and the knowledge of social disapproval 
usually serve to limit our choices. These intuitions evolved in small groups between 
50,000 and some millions of years ago.  In the modern world, the intuitions are often 
not to our long-term advantage and the social controls weak. This is a prime reason 
for the inexorable progress into chaos in the world. 
 
On pg 225 he finally sneaks in a definition of free will as ´´a complicated snarl of 
mechanistic causes that look like decision making (from certain angles)”. He claims 
that this plays all the valuable roles of free will, but lacks some (unspecified) 
properties possessed by traditional free will. The smoke is thick but I am pretty sure 
one of those unspecified properties is what we understand as choice. He insists (top 
of pg 226) that his naturalistic account of decision making leaves plenty of room for 
moral responsibility, but making ourselves so we couldn´t do otherwise does not  
describe the way we actually function, nor does it leave any room for morality, as 
that would consist precisely in being able to do otherwise. 
 
He does not propose any test for deciding if a choice is voluntary or forced and I 
doubt he could do so. Normally if someone asks us to move our hand, we know 
what counts as having a choice, but, typical of philosophers, I expect that regardless 
of whether it moves or not he will count both as evidence for his position and of 
course if everything counts then nothing counts as Wittgenstein so trenchantly 
remarked many times. 
 
At this point he also starts his discussion of Libet´s well known work on conscious 
attention, which is the only part of the book that I felt was worth my time. However, 
Libet’s claim that we make decisions without awareness has been debunked many 
times, by both psychologists and philosophers (e.g., Searle and Kihlstrom). 
 
On page 253 et seq., he sneaks in his definition of conscious will—the ´´brains user 
illusion of itself´´´ which has as one of its main roles providing ´´me with the means 
of interfacing with myself at other times``. And ``Illusory or not, conscious will is 
the persons guide to his or her own moral responsibility for action. `` He says the 
trick we need is to see that ``I`´ control what is happening inside the ´´simplification 
barrier´´... ´´where decision making happens´´. ``Mental events´´ become conscious 
by ´ ´entering into memory´´. ´ ´The process of self description... is what we are´´. The 
crucial thing is that choice is possible because the self is distributed over space (the 
brain) and time (memories). He realizes this is going to leave many incredulous 
(everyone who can follow this and really understands the bizarre language games!). 
´´I know that many people find it hard to grasp this idea or take it seriously.  It 
seems to them to be a trick with mirrors, some kind of verbal slight of hand that 
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whisks consciousness, and the real Self, out of the picture just when it was about to 
be introduced.´´ Many will say he took the words out of their mouth, but I would 
say it´s incoherent and that everything we know about consciousness and the whole 
universe (making the obvious extensions of such claims) was gone long before we 
got this far in his tome. And a careful look at the language games shows their lack 
of coherence (i.e., no clear Conditions of Satisfaction as I note in my articles). 
 
Like most philsophers and nearly all scientists who wax philosophical, he makes 
fatal mistakes in his first sentences – failure to use language in clear (i.e., 
meaningful) ways and all that follows is a house of cards. 
 
 Wittgenstein stated the issue with his usual aphoristic brilliance so I repeat it again. 
 
“How does the philosophical problem about mental processes and states and about 
behaviorism arise? – The first step is the one that altogether escapes notice. We talk 
about processes and states and leave their nature undecided. Sometime perhaps we 
shall know more about them-we think. But that is just what commits us to a 
particular way of looking at the matter. For we have a definite concept of what it 
means to learn to know a process better. (The decisive movement in the conjuring 
trick has been made, and it was the very one we thought quite innocent). —And 
now the analogy which was to make us understand our thoughts falls to pieces. So, 
we have to deny the yet uncomprehended process in the yet unexplored medium. 
And now it looks as though we had denied mental processes. And naturally we 
don’t want to deny them.   W PI p308 
 
On pg 259 he says that culture has made us rational animals! This is a stunning 
denial of human (and animal) nature (i.e., genetics and evolution) coming from the 
person who wrote ´Darwin´s Dangerous Idea´´! 
 
Presumably he is talking about his idea that it is memories spread over space (the 
brain and other people) and time (much like Dawkins’ memes) that give us choices 
and morals and consciousness (line 6 from bottom). He says consciousness is a user-
interface but it is never made clear who or where the user is and how it interfaces 
with the brain (you will have to suffer through ´Consciousness Explained’ to find 
that there is no answer there either). Though he makes many references to 
evolutionary and cognitive psychology, he seldom uses any of the terminology that 
has been current for decades (social mind, intuitive psychology, coalitional 
intuitions etc.) and clearly is not familiar with most of the concepts. If he means that 
we got the fine details of morality from culture, that’s ok, but this is the S2 icing on 
the cake and the S1 cake was baked by the genes. 
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We are also told here that R&D (by which he means evolution here, but other things 
elsewhere) has given us the self and that language creates a new kind of 
consciousness and morality. I am sure that he will get little agreement on this. It 
seems quite clear that consciousness and the basics of morality evolved in primates 
(and earlier) long before spoken language (though it is very contentious as to how 
language evolved from extant capacities in the brain). He continues ``morality 
memes arose by accident some tens of thousands of years ago`` which would be OK 
if he meant the icing on the cake but he clearly means the cake! And then he says 
the point of morality is not the survival of our genes, which is an amazing (and 
totally incorrect) thing to say, even if he was only referring to memes. 
 
On pg 260 he claims that because we do not comprehend our ´´bland dispositions 
to cooperate´´, they mean nothing to us, but it is the operation of our templates (i.e., 
reciprocal altruism promoting inclusive fitness) that is everything to us and to every 
action of all animals. As Dawkins recently noted in his comments on E.O Wilson’s 
disastrous recent work supporting the phantasm of ‘group selection’, natural 
selection is inclusive fitness (see my review of Wilson’s ‘The Social Conquest of 
Earth’). There is ample evidence that if one of our many ‘templates’ is damaged, a 
person cannot function properly as a social being (e.g., autism, sociopathy, 
sczhizophrenia). I would say it is the operation of the templates for intuitive 
psychology etc., which lead people when philosophizing to the counterintuitive 
views that we do not have consciousness and choice.  
 
He also says here that it was one of the major evolutionary transitions when we 
were able to change our views and reflect on reasons for them. This again reflects 
his lack of understanding of evolutionary psychology. I know of no evidence that 
the basic moral intuitions, like all the templates, are accessible to consciousness but 
there is a huge body of work showing the opposite. We may decide our cheating 
was justifiable, or forgive someone else´s cheating, but we still know it was cheating 
(i.e., we cannot change the engine). I suspect my ancestors a million years ago had 
the same feelings in the same situation, but what has happened is that there are now 
lots of other things that may be taken as relevant, and that sometimes these will lead 
me to act contrary to my feelings.  Another issue is that as culture developed, one 
had to make many important or ´moral type` decisions for which the engines were 
not evolved to give a clear answer. 
 
On pg 267 he says that we now replace our `free floating rationales´ (probably 
corresponding to what cognitive psychologists call our templates or inference 
engines) with reflection and mutual persuasion. And on pg 286 he says that it is a 
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child´s upbringing --demanding and giving reasons-- that affects moral reasoning. 
Again, he just has no grasp of what has happened in the last 30 years of research--
the templates are innate S1 automatisms and cannot change with reflection or 
upbringing. We are then told again that consciousness makes moral issues available 
over time to the self, which takes responsibility. It is not any more coherent or 
credible with repetition. 
 
On pg 289 he has a chapter summary which repeats the mistaken notions that it is 
culture that makes it possible to reflect and that choice depends on education 
(memory) and sharing. It´s clear that it is not culture but the inherited cognitive 
structures that make it possible to reflect and to choose and that culture determines 
the acceptable actions and their rewards or punishments. On pg. 303 he discusses 
the classic philosophical barrier between ´ought´ and ´is´, unaware that our 
templates solved that problem long ago— i.e., they tell us how to feel about 
situations regarding other people. He also seems to be unaware that there are 
hundreds of ‘cultural’ universals implanted in our genes (e.g. see Pinker’s ´The 
Blank Slate´) and also of Searle’s classic paper “How to derive Ought from Is”.  
 
He often starts into what looks like it’s going to be a good discussion of some issues 
in evolutionary psychology, but invariably wanders off into philosophical arcana 
and winds up with more confusion. This happens on pg. 261 where he states that 
concepts like ´praiseworthy´ were shaped over millennia by culture, while most 
would say the basis for such concepts is in the genes and each culture only 
determines the details of acceptable reactions to the intuitions its members get from 
their innate mechanisms. On pg 262 he tries to explain how an ESS (Evolutionarily 
Stable Strategy) can produce morality. His idea here is that genetic `R&D` (i.e., 
evolution) produces dim understandings of morals and then culture (memetics) 
produces variations and clarifications. I would say that we all know, and much 
research has made clear, that we commonly get very clear results from our inference 
engines and only dimly understand in special cases. Culture merely decides what 
we can do about our feelings. 
 
The last part of the book is mostly concerned with moral culpability. He refers to 
the legal classic by Hart and Honore, which I started reading 30 years ago, since its 
authors were deeply influenced by Wittgenstein. Dennett tells us that we have 
control over our own morality and that thinking about morality will improve us. 
But, there seems no justification whatever for this view in this book. There is 
nothing at all here to help anyone escape from the dictates of the monkey mind and 
I am quite sure that when industrial civilization collapses in the 22nd century 
people will be acting as their ancestors did 200,000 years ago. It is a defensible point 
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of view that those who manage to escape do so by traveling a spiritual path that has 
no connection with philosophy - and there is not a hint of spirituality in this entire 
book--another telling point considering that many mystics have fascinating things 
to say about the functioning of the mind. I find more wisdom about how to be free 
and moral in any of Osho´s 200 books and tapes than anywhere in philosophy. 
 
Unsurprisingly, one rarely finds spiritually and morally advanced people teaching 
at universities. There is no sign here, nor in anything he has done, that Dennett is 
morally superior. After 40 years of thinking about morality he launches personal 
attacks on his critics or arrogantly dismisses them. It seems clear that, like all of us, 
he is trapped in the limits of his inference engines. 
 
So, how much opportunity is there to improve our morality? It seems clear (e.g., see 
Pinker´s `The Blank Slate`) that most of our behavior is genetic and the rest due to 
unknown factors in our environment, in spite of the vigorous efforts of parents and 
religions and political parties. On average, maybe 5% of the variation in moral 
behavior (variations are the only thing we can study) is due to our own efforts 
(culture). The moral choices that matter most today are those affecting the fate of 
the world. But our templates were not evolved to deal with overpopulation (except 
by murder) and climate change (except by moving elsewhere and killing any 
opposition). 
 
How remarkable it would be if just one of the hundreds of millions of educated 
people in the world managed to figure out what consciousness or choice or any 
mental phenomenon really is (i.e., how to describe its neurophysiological 
correlates). And if one did, we would expect them to be a scientist at the cutting 
edge of research using some exotic fMRI equipment and the latest parallel 
processing neural networked fuzzy logic computer etc. And that would only mean 
they specify the neural circuits and biochemistry/genetics. So, they cannot answer 
the questions of philosophy (the language games of the descriptive psychology of 
higher order thought). But it needs no answer –like the existence of space, time, 
matter, it’s just the way things are and the philosopher’s job is to clarify the 
language games we can play with these words.  But, a philosopher or physicist just 
sitting there thinking, coming up with a scientific solution to the greatest scientific 
puzzle there is! And then writing a whole book about it without checking with the 
sceptics first. To return to the quote at the beginning--´Ambition is the death of 
thought´. Indeed--though clearly Wittgenstein was thinking of profound thought! 
 
